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The  implications  of environmental  externalities  are  studied within  three classes of endoge-
nous growth models viz.  the linear technology models, the human capital models, and the R&D
and  innovation  models.  The  long-run  rate  of economic  growth  changes  when  environmental
extemalities  are  introduced; the direction of change depends on the severity of extemalities  and
the  intertemporal  elasticity  of substitution.  The  presence  of environmental  externalities  cause
the decentralized  growth  rate to diverge  from  the efficient  rate.  Which  rate  is bigger than the
other  depends,  among other things, on  the valuation  of consumption  relative to environmental
quality.  Several policy changes to align the two paths are discussed.  The  models are calibrated
to U.S.  data.
I. Introduction
The  new  growth  theory  has  produced  models with  many  attractive  features2 . First,  the engine
of growth  (be  it  accumulation  of reproducible  capital,  industrial  innovation,  or  research  and
development)  is  endogenous  to the  economy  and  possibly  policy-sensitive.  Second,  learning-
by-doing  is  an  important  source  of technological  change.  Third,  innovation  is  motivated  by
monopoly  profits  which  are  not  completely  appropriable  because  of the  non-rival  nature  of
1Funding provided by USAID through the Environmental  and Natural Resources Project.
2See the  papers  by  Romer  (1994),  Grossman  and  Helpman  (1994),  and  Solow  (1994)  in the  Winter  1994
Symposia on  New  Growth  Theory  in the  Journal  of Economic Perspectives.  For a textbook  treatment see  Barro
and Sala-i-Martin  (1995)  and Grossman and Helpman  (1991).knowledge.  Finally, imperfect  competition  specially  in the innovation  markets  is modelled.
However, the new growth theory  ignores altogether the interaction between  growth and envi-
ronment,  even though  there has been an  increasing concern  about the environment.  The reason
behind this concern is that environmental  externalities have direct and indirect effects on individ-
uals'  welfare.  The direct effects  are related to the harm on human health  and the damage  to the
amenity  value of the environment.  For instance,  according  to the estimates  of the World  Bank
(1992),  lack  of access  to clean  water  and  sanitation  are  the  major  cause  behind  900 millions
cases  of diarrheal  diseases  every year.  About  1.3  billion  people  live in  areas that did  not meet
World Health  Organization's  standard for particulate  matter and  1 billion people  inhabit  areas
that exceeded the standard for sulfur dioxide, hence facing the danger of serious respiratory  dis-
orders  and cancers.  Lead  exposure  accounts to 20% of the incidence of hypertension in Mexico
City.  Victims  of indoor  air  pollution  are  estimated  to be  400 millions.  The  depletion  of the
Ozone  layer as a result of gases released from refrigerant poses also serious health threats.  Loss
of biodiversity  is  also  occurring  at  alarming  rates.  During  the  eighties,  tropical  forests  were
deforested  at an  annual rate of 0.9%.  Acid  rains have also  serious effects  on the amenity  value
of the environment,  killing trees and contaminating  lakes.
The indirect  effects  are  the reduced  productivity  effects  of environmental  degradation.  The
Greenhouse  effect is important  in this category.  Global  warming  as a  result of increasing  emis-
sions of CO 2 is expected to raise the sea level and disrupt agricultural production.  Desertification
resulting  from  cutting trees  affects  the productivity  of agricultural  land  seriously.  In some  in-
stances  it results in a complete  loss of agricultural  land.  (See,  e.g.,  World  Bank,  1992).
Several  models of growth  and environment  have  been proposed.  However, they suffer  from
the  following  drawbacks.  First,  they  ignore  innovations  and technological  change,  one  of the
most important  engines  of growth3. According  to Grossman  and Helpman  (1994)  "a  story  of
3There  are  few  exceptions,  however.  Hung,  Victor, and Blackburn  (1993),  Bovenberg  and  Smulders  (1993),
and  Marrewijk,  Ploeg, and  Verbeek  (1993)  are  examples  of studies that  attempt to incorporate  environment  into
endogenous  growth  models.  The  structure  of our  models and analysis are completely  different from theirs.  For a
2growth that neglects  technological progress is both ahistorical  and implausible"  (p.  26).  Because
they  ignore  innovations,  the  common  result  from  these  models  is  that  optimal  preservation
of environmental  quality  and  economic  growth  are  competitive  objectives.  This  result  is  in
contradiction  with  what  many  economists  believe  (e.g.,  Lucas,  1994).  They  also tend to place
emphasis  on  analyzing  optimal  growth  only  (even  though  markets  do  not behave  optimally)
rather than also considering  a market driven dynamic  equilibrium4. Work which has been done
using market analysis concentrates on the cost of environmental  policy  and ignores externalities
which are  at the heart of environmental  economics5
This  paper  is a first  step toward integrating  the theory of endogenous  economic  growth  and
environmental  economics.  It  attempts to answer questions like the  following.  What  difference
dose  it  make  to  introduce  environmental  considerations  in  endogenous  growth  models?  Do
models  with  environment  have  different  policy  implications  from  those  that exclude  it?  What
are these policy  implications?  Is a competitive  equilibrium  Pareto optimal?  Are there first-best
policies?  If first-best  policies are not  available, would there be second-best  policies?
Endogenous growth models can be grouped into three main categories:  convex models, human
capital models,  and innovation  and R&D models.  Convex models postulate  convex preferences
and production  possibility  set.  Growth  in these models  is  sustained  because of a lower  bound
on the productivity of capital (e.g.,  Jones and Manuelli,  1990, and Rebelo,  1990).  As their name
suggests,  human  capital  models  sustain  growth  through  accumulation  of human  capital  (e.g.,
Lucas,  1988).  The  last category  of models  regard  innovation  and  R&D  activities  (expanding
varieties of goods or upgrading their quality) as a major source of economic growth (e.g.,  Romer,
model  of trade,  environment,  and economic growth see Elbasha and Roe (1995).
4Examples  from this category  are:  Keeler, Spence,  and Zechkauser  (1971);  D'Arge and Kogiku (1972);  Gruver
(1976);  Krautkraemer  (1985);  and Nordhaus  (1991a,  1991b,  1992,  1993).  An exception is  Tahvonen  and Kuulu-
vainen (1993)  who analyze competitive  equilibrium.  In their model,  however, technological  change  is ignored.
5Examples are:  Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1990,  1993),  Blitzer et al.  (1993), Manne and Richels (1990),  Burniaux
et al.  (1992).  There  is also  a growing literature on the empirical  aspects of growth and environment nexus.  (See
for example  Grossman  and Krueger,  1993,  1994,  Skafik and Bandyopadhyay,  1992).  One major limitation  of this
work is that  the estimated  relationship is not derived from a theoretical  model.1990,  and Grossman  and Helpman,  1991).
In this paper we take a representative  model from each category  and analyze the implications
of incorporating  environment  in that  model.  We find  that  the presence of environmental  con-
cerns  makes  a  difference  in  the results that  emerge  from  standard  endogenous  growth  models.
Growth models which ignore the effects of the environment  on welfare produce different growth
rates  from  the  ones  that  incorporate  those  effects.  Whether  larger  or  smaller  depends  on the
intertemporal  elasticity of substitution and the valuation of the environment relative to consump-
tion.  The standard  comparative  static results  obtained from  endogenous growth models  without
the  environment  remains  valid  only  if the  elasticity  of intertemporal  substitution  is  very  high
and/or consumption  is valued  more than the  environment.  If these conditions  are not met, we
arrive  at the  opposite results6. In the presence  of environmental  externalities,  the decentralized
growth rate can be larger or smaller than the efficient rate depending,  inter alia,  on whether the
environment  is valued  more or less compared to consumption.
The paper is organized as follows.  In Section II we introduce environment in the three models
of endogenous growth.  Agents  in all these models get utility from consuming the only final good
and enjoying the quality  of the  environment.  Environment  is polluted as a result of production
activities taking place  in  the final  output  sector.  In  the first model  there  is only  one factor  of
production  and  it can  be accumulated  as  foregone  consumption.  In the  second  model  human
capital  is the engine of growth.  The final model is innovation-based and innovation is undertaken
in the R&D sector which sells its blueprints to a monopolistic intermediate inputs sector.  Growth
takes place  as  a result  of expansion  in the  varieties  of intermediate  inputs.  In this  section we
discuss  the  "competitive"  equilibrium  and  derive  the  determinants  of sustained  growth  for  all
three models.  The solution to  a social  planner's problem  is also discussed  and compared to the
market equilibrium.  We also  derive the  conditions under which  the two  solutions are different.
Section  III  shows  how  a government  can  intervene to  secure  optimal  allocations  of resources.
6The  comarative  static results  for the  model  without the environment  are:  growth rates  varies  positively with
productivity and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and negatively with the discount rate across steady states.
4In  Section IV we  summarize  our results and provide  concluding remarks.
II. Endogenous  growth  models  and the environment
In all the models we present below there  are many identical infinitely-lived  consumers.  Popula-
tion growth  is taken to be zero.  Preferences  of a representative  consumer are represented  by the
following instantaneous  utility function7
1  ([C(t)OQ(t)]  I
- a  -1  for a  1
Ut  1  1 -fo  (1)
Slog C(t) + p log Q(t)  for a = 1,
where  C(t)  denotes  per  capita  consumption  at time t,  and  Q(t)  stands  for the  quality  of the
environment.  To satisfy  monotonicity and strict concavity  assumptions  we impose the following
restrictions:  a,  ,5,  p > 0,  q(1  - a)  < 1, /(1  - a)  < 1, (0 + A)( 1 - a)  <  1.
There are two approaches  for modeling changes  in the quality of the environment:  stock and
flow.  The  first  approach  treats  Q  as  a  stock  variable,  the  growth  function  of which  changes
negatively  with economic  activity,  as approximated  by aggregate  output, and positively  with the
rate  of natural  decay.  Examples  of this  are  the quality  of air and  water.  The  second  approach
regards  Q  as  a  flow  variable  being  affected  negatively  by  aggregate  economic  activity.  An
extreme  example  of this is noise pollution.  Since  many  of the endogenous  growth  models have
two  state  variables,  treating  environmental  quality  as  a  stock  variable  will  add  another  state
variable  to the model  which extremely  complicates  the analysis.  Our goal is simplicity.  To that
end, we regard  environmental  quality  as  a flow variable and  assume the following  relation
Q(t) = AQ[Y(t)]-~,  AQ  > 0,  O  > 0,  (2)
7This  utility  function exhibits  the  following  properties  (i)  the  elasticity  of the  marginal  rate  of substitution
between  consumption  and environmental  quality  with respect to consumption,  9  log(UQ  /Uc)/  logC, is equal to
one; (ii) the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption is constant and equal to 1  - 0(1 - r);  (iii) the elasticity
of the  marginal  utility of environmental  quality  is  constant and equal  to  1 - u(1 - a); and  (iv) Inada  conditions:
limcoU0  =  oo, limc•.oo U  =  0, limQ-oUQ =  oo, limQooUQ  =  0.where Y(t)  is aggregate  output  at time t8.
H.1  A Convex  Endogenous  Growth Model
We first consider environment  in the simplest endogenous growth model (Rebelo,  1990).  In this
model there is only one factor of production:  capital which is broadly defined.  Production takes
place  according  to the following  constant returns to  scale  technology
Y(t)  = AK(t),  A >  0,  (3)
where  K(t)  stands  for capital  at time  t.  We assume  capital  doesn't depreciate  so we  have the
usual  income identity
C(t) + K(t) = Y(t).  (4)
The current  value Hamiltonian  for the  social planner's  problem is
1
H  =  r[(CeQ1-)' -  - 1]  + A(AK  - C),
where  A is the costate variable associated  with  the state variable  K.  The  following conditions,
together with the transversality  conditions,  are necessary  and sufficient  for an optimal  solution
8H OH  0  =  CO(1--)--Q1 (1- "  )  =  A  (5)
OC
pA  OK =  A =  pA +  ,C¢('-O)Q'( -)/K  - AA,  (6)
where p denotes the discount rate.
We  analyze  only  the  steady  state  equilibrium  in  which  K/K  =  C/C  =  Y/Y  =  g  is  a
constant9. Using  this fact and combining  equations  (2),  (3),  (4), (5),  and (6)  yields
A(l  - rlq/)  - p
g =  - (7)
8Qf course  the flow approach  is a special  case of the stock approach.
9It can be shown  that equilibrium in this model  does not involve transitional  dynamics.  That is, the economy is
always in a steady  state.
6where T  =  1 - 0(1  - a)  +  -LF(1  - a). Note that the growth rate in  equation  (7)  can be positive
or negative.  However, if we impose the assumption that investment is irreversible (K 2  0), then
g  0.
In  the  decentralized  solution  consumers  treat  Q  as  given  as  far  as  their  consumption  and
capital  accumulation  decisions  are  concerned.  Thus  equation  (6),  in  competitive  equilibrium,
becomes
A = pA - AA.  (8)
Following the same procedure  as before we calculate the decentralized  growth rate as
A-p
gm  =  T  (9)
There  is  one  technical  difficulty  we  need  to  deal  with  concerning  the  growth  formulas  in
equations  (7)  and  (9),  namely  the utility  function  might  not be  finite in the  steady  state  equi-
librium.  To  avoid  this  problem  we  make  the  following  restrictions:  (1 - ')g  - p  <  0  and
(1 - )gYm  - p  <  0.  If  we  use  the  formulas  in  equations  (7)  and  (9)  we  can  rewrite  these
restrictions  as  [(1  - ')A  - p]/[l - 0(1  - a)]  <  0  and  [(1  - ')A  - p]/1  <  0,  respectively.
Since  1 - 0(1  - a)  > 0  by our concavity  assumptions,  we have  (1 - ,)A - p < 0 which, using
the  second  constraint,  implies  I  >  0.  We  would also want  to have C/K =  A - g  >  0 which
amounts to  [(1  - I)A - p]/{(1 - prj//)[1 -I(1 - a)]}  <  0.  This, with the restriction  on  the
boundedness  of the utility function,  implies 0  > pnr.  We have proved the following  proposition.
Proposition 1 Equilibrium  exists only if consumers value consumption more than environmental
quality.
The market growth  rate  in equation  (9)  has the following properties.
Proposition 2  Growth is higher (i)  the more productive is the economy  (as measured by A);
(ii) the  lower is the rate of time preference (p);  (iii)  the greater the  intertemporal elasticity
of substitution between consumption at two points in time (c  = 1/[1  - 4(1  - r)] );  or (iv) thesmaller is the intertemporal  elasticity of substitution between environmental quality at two points
in time  (ýQ  = 1/[1  - (1l - a)]).
Proof  Differentiating  equation (9)  with respect  to the relevant  variable we obtain
Ogm  1 (i)  > 0. 9A  T
0gm  1 (ii)   - < 0.
0gm  _  9gm  0T  0F  0gm (iii)  . But  <O  . So,  > 0.
0d  =  I,  0{ •B.
)gm  _  m  4g 0I  9  Og  M
(iv)  - ---..  But  > 0.  So,  < 0.
4OQ  ^ (9Q  0  ^Q
Qualitatively  some  of these comparative  statics results  are  the same  as those  obtained from
the model  without the environment.  If we ignore  environmental  externalities,  the denominator
of equation  (9)  is replaced  by  the  expression  1 - q(1  - a) which  is  also positive if the utility
function is  strictly concave.  However, the quantitative  effects  of environmental  externalities  are
important as the following proposition  suggests.
Proposition 3  Convex growth models that ignore the environment (i.e.  p• r- = 0) produce growth
rates  which  are greater,  equal  to,  or smaller than those which incorporate the  environment
depending on whether the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is greater than, equal to,  or
smaller  than one, respectively.
Proof  Differentiating  equation  (9) with respect to p yields
9gm  gm9  a  9F  o9gm >  > SBut  =  (1 - a).  So,  0  as a  1. The latter requires  c = 1.
d(  A  d-li  da  d4A  B 
<   <
>
Because  there is a negative externality  from output  producers  imposed  on consumers  which
is not  priced  in  the market  equilibrium,  one  would expect  the  market growth  rate to be larger
than the Pareto optimal  rate.  This conjecture  is true  as the following  proposition shows.
Proposition 4  The competitive equilibrium growth rate is greater than the optimal rate.Proof  Let pA # 0.  From equations  (7) and (9) we have gm - g =  -p•[A(1  - IP)  - p]/vP(XP  -
pgr/)). But in the optimal  solution, the integral  in the  consumer's problem  is finite if and only
if  (1 - p~/I)  [A(1 - T)  - p]/(J - pyl/q)  < 0.  Thus gm - g >  0 since  >  > p  and  9I  is positive.
Notice that if pl  = 0, the two growth rates  would be identical  which is an intuitive  result. U
We now  attempt to calibrate  this  model  to U.S.  data.  From  Cropper  (1981)  we  can  obtain
an estimate  for p.  Cropper (1981)  regresses the logarithm  of time spent ill on the logarithm  of
pollution  (SO 2). He obtains a coefficient of 0.3.  Hence, p = 0.3.  The growth rate of SO2  in the
U.S. between  1940-1989 is .0032 per year (Statistical  Abstract).  Since the growth rate of output
per  capita is  .014  (Lucas,  1988),  we have  r  =  .0032/.014  =  .2285.  Hall  (1988)  presents  many
estimates  for the intertemporal  elasticity  of substitution.  One of the estimates is  obtained using
Summers data.  Even though it was obtained without consideration  for the environment,  we will
use  his estimate  of .34  for  the purposes  of these exercises.  In  order  to reduce  the number  of
parameters  to be  estimated  we  set  ¢ =  1 so  that  the  elasticity  of substitution  is  measured  by
I/a. Hence,  a = 2.941.  This enables  us to calculate T  as 2.808.  Since the rate of interest,  r,
is  .0675  (Lucas,  1988),  the  marginal  productivity  of capital,  A,  is equal  to  .0675.  Because  in
equilibrium Tg + p =  r  , we have  p =  .0281.
With these estimates the market and efficient rates of growth are  .014 and .0126, respectively.
Hence,  according  to this  model  the U.S.  economy  is  exceeding  its rate  of growth  by  0.2%.  It
also suggests that environment  is being degraded at a faster rate than what is optimally warranted
(at a  rate of .0032 compared  to .0029).
1.2  Human Capital Models
We take  the model  of Lucas  (1988,  Sec.  4)  as a representative  of models  in which  the engine
of growth  is  human  capital  accumulation.  In  this model  there  are  two  factors  of production:
physical  and human capital.  There are N identical workers, each endowed with one unit of time
that has to be allocated between  work, u, and human  capital accumulation.  The  level of human
capital  of each worker  is  denoted by  h.  So, the effective  workforce  is uhN.  Since  populationgrowth  is zero,  we  normalize  N  to one  and measure  every  variable  in  per  capita terms.  The
production  function  has  similar  properties  as that  in  equation  (3),  namely  it  exhibits  constant
returns to scale to all reproducible factors.  In addition there are external effects of human capital,
denoted by  ha. Thus,
Y(t)  = AK(t)[[u(t)h(t)]X-}ha(t)',  0<  </  <1, -7 > 0.  (10)
Human capital  is accumulated  according  to the following  relation
h(t) = 6h(t)[1 - u(t)],  6 > 0.  (11)
The  current value Hamiltonian  for the  social  planner's  problem is
1
H  =  [(C Q")'-" - 1]  +  O 1[AK'(uh)'-h'  - C] + 026h(1  - u),
where  01  and  02 denote the costate variables associated with physical  and human capital,  respec-
tively.  The following  are necessary  conditions for optimality
OH
=  0  -O0
( 1- 0 )- Q(1-"  )  =  1,  (12) aC
O  =  0  (1 - 3)  1 -1=•-  = 026h  (13)
&U,  uY 8H  Y  Pl  C 01  =  pO-  0,  = p-  - 01 0  1  )  (14) 8  KK  0  Y)
OH  YI  -nYC(
02  =  P02  O  2  2  (l/  7)cl  - 82 6(1 - u).  (15) Oh  =   P02-  02 = P02 - 0a (1 - +3  +  10)---  1  ¢  y A  h  (  Y)
It should be  noted  that in  deriving  conditions  (13-15),  we have  made use of equations  (2)  and
(12).  Combining equations  (13)  and  (15)  we arrive  at
02  6(16)
=p  - 6 - -u.  (16) 02  1-P
In  what  follows  we  concentrate  on  analyzing  the  properties  of the  steady  state  which  we
define as the state that  satisfy all the above conditions and, in addition,  all the variables grow at
constant rates while u is constant.  It is not difficult to show that capital,  consumption, and output
10all  grow  at  the  same  constant  rate.  Let us  denote  this rate  by g  and  the rate at which  human
capital  accumulates  by v.  Thus from equations (10)  and  (11)  we have g = (1- 1+  7)v/(1 - 3)
and  v = 6(1 - u).  Substituting  equation  (2)  into equation  (12)  and differentiating  the resulting
equation  with respect to time yields
=  -'  g.  (17)
01
Differentiating  equation  (13)  with  respect to time  and using equation  (17)  gives
= (1 -\  )9g  - . (18)
Combing equations  (11),  (16),  and  (18)  and rearranging  we arrive  at the optimal  rate of human
capital accumulation
S  6 - p1-  ).  (19) v-1-  )"
In the market equilibrium  equation  (13)  becomes
8H  Y =  0 =O  01(1 - - =  026h,  (20)
which  if combined  with equation  (17)  once again yields equation  (18).  However,  equation  (16)
changes  to
02
= p - 6.  (21)
Combining  equations (18)  and  (21)  gives the market rate of human  capital  accumulation,  vm,  as
(6 - p)(1  -)  ( vM-  (-/3+)  (22)
As  before  we  want  the  growth  formulas  in  equations  (19)  and  (22)  to  satisfy  the  following
restrictions:  v > 0,  Vm  > 0,  (1 - )(1  - 3 + y)v/(1  - p)  - p  < 0, (1 - T)(1 - 3 + 7)m/(1 -
/3)  - p  < 0. The last two  restrictions  require  {(1 - I,)(1 - 3  + 7y)6/(1 - P) - p}/l  < 0 and
{(1 - P)(1 - P + 7)6/(1 - 0)  - p}/[T(l  - 0 + 7) - 7]  < 0.  This implies x(1 - 3 + 7) - 7
has the same sign  as T.
Proposition  5  if '  is greater  (less) than zero, growth would be higher (i) the more (less) produc-
tive is the economy (as measured by 6); (ii) the lower (higher) is the rate of time preference  (p);
11(ii)  the greater (smaller) the intertemporal  elasticity of substitution  between consumption at two
points in time (ýc  = 1/[1 - q(1 - o)] );  or (iv)  the smaller (greater)  is the intertemporal  elasticity
of substitution between environmental quality at two points in time  ((Q  = 1/[1 - I(1 - a)] ).
Proot  Differentiating equation  (22)  with respect  to the relevant variable we obtain
avm  1 -3
(i) 0   =  <  as  <0.
dvm  1
(ii)  - - 1  <0  as T  0.
(iii)  - =  1-  +.  But  <  . So  as  < > 0.
(iv)  - -M  - - ----.  But  9  > 0.  So,  --  >  0  as T !  0. 0 (iv)  =Q  -I-(1-/3+7y)--7•Q  Q  S  Q
One can  immediately  notice  how incorporating  environmental  externalities  into this endoge-
nous growth model changes the results.  To see that remember  in this model without the environ-
ment (i.e.  when pr  = 0), the denominator in equation (22) is equal to [1-k(1-a)][(1-/3+)-7]
which is positive if the human capital externality,  7, is mild.  In that case growth increases with A
and ýc  and decreases with p.  However, in the case where environmental  externalities are present,
the  denominator  can  be negative  and  in  that  circumstance  these  comparative  static  results  are
reversed.  Notice  that 9 is  negative  only  if ar  >  1 and  pir  > 0.  That  is,  T  is negative  when
the  elasticity  of intertemporal  substitution  is low  and  agents  value the  environment  more than
consumption.  The  intuition behind  the results reported  in Proposition  5 is as follows.  Suppose
there  is an  exogenous  increase  in  productivity.  This  has two  opposing  effects  on welfare.  On
the one  hand,  as the economy  becomes  more  productive  consumers  will  be able to enjoy  more
consumption  and increase  investment  in  both physical  and  human  capital  because  the rates of
return  are  higher.  On the other  hand,  environment  is  degraded  as more consumption  goods  are
produced.  If consumption  is valued more than the environment  and/or the elasticity  of substitu-
tion is high, consumers respond by increasing the rate at which they are consuming and investing.
If however, the elasticity  of substitution  is low and consumers  value consumption  less than the
environment, consumers invest and consume at a slower rate.  The rest of the comparative  statics
12results can  be explained  in  a similar manner.
Proposition 6  Growth is higher the less (more) consumers value consumption than environment
as the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is less (greater)  than one.
Proof  Agents  value  consumption  more  than  the  environment  if and  only  if 4  >  r]  . Let
T  =  1 +  (pur  - 0)(1  - a) be positive.  Then  T  is  smaller and  growth  is  higher if and  only if
0  is greater  (smaller)  than  pAr  and  a is  smaller  (greater) than  one.  The  case  where  TI  <  0  is
consistent with the above result  since T  < 0 only if a >  1 and gr>  > 0. E
Whether the market  produces  excessive  capital  accumulation  or  not  is not  clear right  away.
There  are  two  externalities  in  this model:  a negative  externality  from  pollution and  a  positive
spill-over  effects of human  capital.  The following proposition  shows which  externality  is more
dominant.
Proposition  7  If there is no externality from human capital (i.e.  y  = 0),  the optimal growth rate
and the market rate would be identical. If 7 > 0, the market rate is always below  the efficient
rate provided T  > 0.  If 7 >  0 and T  < 0, the market rate is above the efficient rate.
Proof  If 7  =  0,  then  the  right  hand  side  of equations  (19)  and  (22)  are  identical  and  so  are
the growth  rates.  For the  case  7 >  0  subtract  equation  (19)  from equation  (20)  to get  Uv  -
= 7(1  - 0 + "7)[ 6(1 - P)(1 - 3 + 7)/(1 - /)  - p]/(1 - /3)I[(1 - /  + 7) - 7].  But utility is
bounded  in the market solution  only if [6(1-  'I)(1-/  P+7)/( -/3)-p]/[I(1-/  +7) -y]  < 0.
Therefore  if I  > 0,  then the market rate is always below the efficient rate.  If  < 0, the market
rate is above the efficient  rate. U
Given  a positive  human  capital  externality,  environmental  externalities  cause  optimal  rate to
exceed  the market  growth  rate if consumption  is more valued than the environment  and/or  the
elasticity  of substitution  is high.  The market growth rate is higher than the optimal rate when the
environment  is  more valued  and the elasticity  of substitution is low.  However,  unlike previous
results,  environmental  externalities  do not  cause a  divergence  between  the  two rates  if there is
13no human capital  externality.
When calibrating his model to U.S.  data,  Lucas (1988)  uses the following equilibrium  values
for  some of the  key variables:  output  growth 0.014,  growth  rate  of human  capital  0.009,  and
rate of return on capital  of 0.0675.  He obtains the following  parameters estimates:  /  = .25 and
7 =  0.417.  He  also  gives  an  estimate  for  6 but since  we don't  allow  population  growth,  we
adjust his estimate to 0.0625.  Using these parameters values with our earlier estimates of I  and
p we calculate the efficient rates of growth  for human capital  and output as 0.0158  and 0.0246,
respectively.  The  optimal  effort need  to  be devoted  to  human  capital  accumulation  is  0.2528.
So,  the U.S.  economy  ought to  increase  the  effort  devoted  to  human  capital  accumulation  by
75% and enjoy growth in output about one percentage point more.  If we ignore the environment,
the implied value for p is  0.0265.  Hence, the "efficient"  rate  of human capital  accumulation is
0.0155, the rate of output growth is .0241, and the time devoted to education is 0.248.  Therefore,
the model without the environment  understates the efficient rate of economic  growth by 0.0005.
Unlike the previous model, this model  suggests that the U.S. economy hasn't reached the optimal
rate of environmental  degradation  yet.  The optimal  rate of environmental  degradation is .0056
in contrast to the actual  rate of .0032.
H.3  R&D and Innovation Models
The  model  that  will  be  presented  here  is  more  disaggregated  than  the  previous  models  (See
Grossman  and Helpman,  1991,  Chap.  5, and Romer,  1990, for models  of this type).  It consists
of the following  sectors:
(i) Final  output sector. This sector consists of a large number of identical firms which produce
the  consumer  good.  There  are  three  factors  of production:  capital,  K, labor,  Ly,  and  a  set  of
intermediate  inputs, D.  The production technology  is  a Cobb-Douglas function of the form
Y(t) = AK"DJL;- - ,  A4,  a,  3 > 0,  a + /  < 0.  (23)
14The index  of differentiated  intermediate goods, D, is given by
UM(t)  \ 1b
D =  x(i)6di)  ,  < 6 < 1,  (24)
where  M(t)  denotes  the  measure  of  differentiate  products  available  in  the  market  at time  t.
Both  the product  space,  {i : 0  < i < oo},  and its  subset,  the set  of brands  available  at time t,
[0,  M(t)],  are  assumed  to be  continuous.  In this  model  technological  change  is  the engine  of
growth  which occurs  as  a result of expansion  in  the variety of differentiated  goods.
We will continue to assume that final output producers pollute the environment and the relation
between  economic  activity and  environmental  quality  is governed by  equation  (2).
(ii)  Intermediate inputs sector. We  assume that each brand i E  [0,  M] of differentiated inputs
is produced by  a single  firm.  Once it acquires the license to use the blueprints  of brand i, firm
i will  become the  sole producer of that brand.  It uses only labor as a factor of production.  It is
assumed here that  a unit of output of brand i, x(i), is produced using only  1/A,  units of labor,
L,(i).  So,
x(i) = AL, (i),  Ax  >  0.  (25)
(iii)  R&D sector. We  assume there exits  a sector  that undertakes  research  and development.
This  sector consists  of a  large number  of firms.  A representative  firm in  this sector uses labor,
Lm,  and  knowledge  (see  below)  to produce  new  blueprints  and  so add  to the  set  of available
brands.  The technology  for this  product development  is given by
A  =  AmLmKm,  Am  >  0,  (26)
where Km  denotes the stock of knowledge which, for simplicity, we take to be equal to M.  That
is, Km  =  M.
We  will  abandon  our  previous  assumption  that  all  markets  are  competitive  and  allow  the
market for differentiated  inputs to be  monopolistic.  The rest of the sectors  remain competitive.
The objective of a representative final output producer is to maximize profits taking the output
15price, input prices,  and number of differentiated  inputs as given.  Formally,
max  Y - wL  - rK - PD  s.t.  (23), (24),
Y,D,Ly,K,x(i)
where  w  is wage  rate,  r is interest rate,  and pd denotes  the price  of D.  Instead  of solving the
whole  problem  at once we will  utilize the  nature of the objective  function  and  constraints  and
use  some  results from  duality theory  to decompose  it into two  smaller problems.  The  solution
of these  small problems  will  of course solve  the  original  problem.  It is helpful  to think of the
activities  in the final output  sector as being carried in two different departments:  production  and
intermediate  inputs assembly  department.
The  problem  in  the  production  department  is  to choose  Ly,  K,  and  D so  as to  minimize
wLy + rK +pdD subject to the production function in equation  (23).  This gives rise to the usual
Cobb-Douglas  cost function.  Maximization  of profits  for this department is achieved  by setting
price equal to  the unit costo 1 . That is,
1 =Bra•Pw' -a-1 ,   (27)
where B- 1  =  AyaO/3(1 - a  - /•)-a-.
The  demand  functions  for K,  D, and  Ly  can  be obtained  using  Shepherd's  lemma  by  dif-
ferentiating the  cost  function  in  equation  (27)  with respect  to the  relevant  input price.  Thus,
K = aY/r, D = 3Y/pd,  and  Ly = (1 - a - 3)Y/w.
In the intermediate  inputs  assembly  department  the demand  for  a differentiated  input is  ob-
tained  by  solving  the  second  problem  which  entails  minimizing  expenditure  on  differentiated
products  subject to the  production  function in  equation (24).  The  cost  function  resulting from
solving this problem  is
Spx(i)x(i)di= D  p.(  (-1)dj)  (28)
10As we did earlier, we  chose the  final output's price as the numeraire.
16where px(i) denotes the price of brand i.  The demand for a differentiated  input x(i) is obtained,
through  Shepherd's lemma, by  differentiating the above function  with respect  to px(i).  Hence,
x(i) = pX(i)11'6-1)D  (  px(j)6(6dj  , i E  [0, M].  (29)
Profits maximization  for this department  requires  equating  the price  index pd  to the unit cost,
the latter  is obtained  by  differentiating  the right hand  side  of equation  (28)  with  respect to  D.
Thus, (  M  )()-1)/
Pd-  p(j  66-1)dj  . (30)
Each  firm  in the  intermediate  goods  sector  maximizes  profit  taking  into  account  the  demand
function  in  equation  (29).  The level  of profits  of firm i is given by
(i) = [(i)  - -W]x(i),  i E [0,  MI],  (31)
Ax
where 7r(i)  denotes  profits of firm i from producing brand i.  Profits are maximized by charging
a  price  such that
px(i)= - [0, AM].  (32)
Therefore,  in  equilibrium  p,,  x,  and  hence  the  level  of profit  7r,  are  the  same  for  all  firms
producing intermediate  inputs.  The common profit  level  is
7 = (1 - 6)px.  (33)
Firms  in the R&D  sector  choose  AM  and  Lm  to maximize pmM(t) - wLm  subject  to equation
(26)  taking as given  the price of a new design, Pm, and stock of knowledge,  M.  This gives rise
to the following  condition
w
Pm  AmM  (34)
Free entry in  and exit from the R&D sector guarantees  that the price of a new design at time
t is equal  to the  cumulative  present  value  of profits  any  firm  in the  intermediate  goods  sector
earns.  That is,
pm(t) =  je-j,  (n)dnTr(s)ds.  (35)
17Differentiating  equation  (35) with respect to time and making use  of that  equation  again yields
the following  no-arbitrage  condition
Pm(t) ±  r(t) M(+  =  (t).  (36)
Pm(t)  pm (t)
Equation  (36)  says  the following:  the rate  of return  from  holding  equities  (i.e.  dividends  plus
capital  gains  or losses) is  equal  to the rate  of return  on a  consumption  loan  which  is,  in turn,
equal to the rental  rate of capital.
The  consumer's problem  can  be written as
max  Ut e-Ptdt
C(t)  Jo
s.t.  C (t) + it(t) = w(t)L + r (t) a (t) ,
where  a(t)  denotes  the  total  stock  of assets  (nonhuman  wealth)  held  at  time  t  and  p  is  the
discount rate.  Application  of the maximum  principles  yields the following condition
C(t)  Q(t) (1  - )  1]  + (1  - a)  =  p  -  r(t).  (37)
C-  (t)  Q (t)
In equilibrium, total  usage of labor should be equal to total  labor endowment.  That  is,
Lm(t) +  Ly(t)  +  Lx(t)  =  L,  (38)
where LT  denotes total  demand  for labor by the intermediate inputs  sector.
In order to calculate  the equilibrium growth  rate we  proceed  as follows.  We  obtain  demand
for labor in all  sectors, make use of equations  (36)  and (38),  and then eliminate interest rate by
virtue of equation (37).  Using the  demand  function  for  D, equations  (33),  and the  accounting
identity Mpx = pdD, we can  rewrite equation  (36) as
p+  (1  - 6) Y +  = r.  (39)
Pm  Mpm
By solving for w from equation (34)  and using the demand for labor in the final  good sector
we  obtain  L,  =  (1 - a  - 3)Y/AmMpm.  From  equation  (25)  the  demand  for  labor  in  all
18intermediate  input  sectors  is  L  =  ML,(i)  =  Mx/Ax,  and  the  identity  MPxx  =  pdD  gives
x = pd D/Mpx.  Hence,  Lx  = pd D/pxAx.  But from the demand function  for  D,  equation  (32)
and (34)  we have pdD/pxAx  =  36Y/AmMp,.  The demand for labor  in the intermediate goods
sector  is, therefore,  given by  Lx  = /36Y/AmMpm.  The Demand  for labor in the R&D  sector is
obtained  directly  from equation  (26),  noting that  M/M  =  gm  and Km  =  M, as  Lm = gm/Am.
Substituting  these sectorial  labor demand  functions into the  resource  constraint,  equation  (38),
gives
Y
gm +  [1  - a - /(1  - 6)]  =  -AmL.  (40)
Mpm
Solving for Y/Mpm  from  the above equation  and  substituting it in  equation  (39) we  arrive at
S+  (-6  (AmL - m)  r.  (41)
pm  1 - a  - 3(1 - 6)
As  we  did with  earlier  models,  we  will  analyze  only the  steady  state  equilibrium;  an  equi-
librium  in  which  both  M  and pm  grow  at  constant  (not  necessarily  the  same)  rates.  If gm  is
constant, then  from  equation  (40), Y/Mpm  is also constant  over time  and Y  grows  at the same
rate  as  p,m.  Let  us  denote  the  growth  rate  of Y  by  g.  Equation  (34)  implies  w  grows  at
rate g,  which  in  turn using  equation  (32)  suggests  that 1px/px  = g.  The constancy  of Y/Mpm,
together with the demand functions for  Lx  and  Ly,  imply that all  sectorial demands for labor are
constant.  Equation  (39)  and the fact that Pm/Pm being constant  imply that the rate of interest is
also constant.  This together with the demand function  for capital  suggest a common growth rate
for Y  and  K.  Output  and capital  growing  at the same  rate implies,  using the national  income
identity (equation  (4)),  the same growth  rate for consumption.  Differentiating equation  (2)  with
respect to time and observing that Y  grows at rate g,  we arrive at the result that Q grows at rate
-rig.  Using this fact in  equation  (37)  we obtain
Jg =  r(t) - p,  (42)
where  as before  'I  =  1 - 4(1 - a) +  /r7(1  - a)  . The  fact that the total  demand  for labor  in
the intermediate  inputs sector  is constant implies that x/x =  -gm. This suggests that D  grows
19at rate  (1 - 6)g1/6. If we make use of this result  in the production function  given in equation
(23),  we arrive at
S  /3(1 - 6)
S= g =  (-  gm.  (43) Y  6(1  -a)
Equation (34)  implies
Pm  W  M  (/(1-6)
- - lgm.  (44)
pm  w  M  6(1  - a)  mi  (44)
The  growth  rate, gm,  can  easily  be obtained  now by combining  equations  (41),  (42),  (43),  and
(44)  and rearranging.  Thus,
AAmL  - p
gm  =  _  (45) +  (1  - 6)
6(1 - a)
where  A = /(1  - 6)/[1 - a - /(1  - 6)].  It  should be noted that in this equilibrium the integral
in the  consumer's utility  is always  finite provided  p > (1 - I)g.  This  is the  same  expression
we encountered  earlier.
As will be shown  later, the sign of the denominator  of equation (45) is the same as the sign of
i.  Therefore, the relationship  between  productivity  (Am),  rate of time preference  (p), the elas-
ticity of intertemporal  substitution  between  consumption  (c),  and the elasticity  of intertemporal
substitution between  environmental  quality  ((Q)  and the rate of economic  growth is the same as
that  reported in Proposition  5. The results  of Propositions 3 and 6 are also valid for this model.
In addition  we will have the following  proposition.
Proposition 8  The  growth rate is higher the  larger (smaller) is the endowment of labor (L)
provided A + /(1  - 6)(qV  - 1)/6(1 - a) + 1 is greater (smaller) than zero. If  <  < 0, the growth
rate decreases with the endowment of labor.
Proof  To  prove  this proposition  we  only  need  to differentiate  equation  (45)  with respect  to
L.  Thus,  Og/L =  Am/[A +  /(1  - 6)(I  - 1)/6(1 - a)  +  1].  This is  positive  or  negative  as
A + /(1  - 6)(I - 1)/6(1 - a) +1  is positive or negative.  We will  show now that the latter term
is positive  (negative)  if I  is (positive)  negative.  Suppose  i  > 0.  Then for the utility  function
20to be bounded  in the optimal  solution  we need to have  3(1 - 6)(T  - 1)AmL/6(1  - a)  < p (see
equation  (46)  below).  But  the  labor resource  constraint  in  the  market  solution  requires  labor
employed  in  R&D be  less  than  total  labor endowment.  That  is,  [/3(1  - 6)(  - 1)AmL/6(1  -
a)  - p - AmL]/[A  +  3(1  - 6)(T  - 1)/6(1  - a)  +  1]  <  0.  These  two  inequalities  imply
A+(1l-6)(W -1)/6(1-a)+l  > 0.  Let us assume T  < 0.  Then for the efficient rate to positive
we  need  ((1  - 6)AmL/6(1  - a)  < p.  Because  A  <  /(1  - 6)/6(1 - a)  we have  AAmL  < p.
Thus for the market rate to be positive  we need  A +  3(1  - 6)(I  - 1)/6(1  - a)  +  1 < 0. E
The  social  planner's problem  for this model  can be written  as
max j  Ut e-Pdt
c(t) Jo
s.t.  (2),  (4),  (23),  (24),  (25),  (26),  (38).
The optimal  growth  rate of innovation  is given by  (see  Appendix  1 for the derivation)
(  AmL  -p
8(1 - a)
9m  =  (1-6)  (46) S(1 - 6)
6(1 - a)
If I  > 0, the optimal  growth  calculated in equation  (46) has the following properties:  growth
is higher,  the larger  the labor  endowment,  the more  productive  is labor  in the R&D  sector,  and
the  less patient the  society becomes.  If '  <  0, we  obtain  the opposite  results, namely  optimal
growth  varies  negatively with endowment,  productivity,  and the degree of impatience.
Unlike the previous  models,  in this model  there are three  distortions:  (a) imperfect  competi-
tion in  the market  for intermediate  inputs,  (b)  a  positive  externality  in the R&D  sector,  and  (c)
a pollution  externality  from  final  output  producers  negatively  affecting  consumers.  The  distor-
tion  resulting  from  the  noncompetitive  pricing of intermediate  inputs  is  a  static one  while the
externality  from  knowledge  spill-overs  has  a dynamic  nature.  The last distortion  is the  subject
matter of this study.
Proposition 9  If /3(1 - 6)/6(1 - a)  =  1, the steady state equilibrium is of the balanced  growth
type in which Y, K, C, and M  grow at the same rate while pm is constant.
21Proof  Use this condition  in  equations (43)  and (44)  the result will follow. U
Proposition  10  Let F = 1+A-  /(1-6)/6(1-a).  In the absence ofany government intervention,
the decentralized  competitive  equilibrium growth path  is always below  the Pareto optimal one
provided r  > 0 and T  >  0.  Ifr >2 0 and  TI  <  0, the market rate is greater  than the efficient
rate.
Proof  Let  I  > 0.  We will  first show that the numerator  in equation (45) is always smaller than
that in equation (46).  A sufficient condition for this to be true is A  < /(1  -6)/6(1  - a). Suppose
this condition is not satisfied.  Instead we will have A  >  /(1  -6)/6(1  -a).  After rearranging and
canceling  some terms, we will arrive at the condition  a +/p  > 1, an obvious contradiction  to our
restrictions on the parameters a and /.  Second, the denominator in equation (45) is always bigger
than that in  equation  (46)  provided  F > 0.  Since equation  (43)  has  a  smaller numerator  and  a
bigger denominator than equation (46), it follows that gm  < gn.  If I, < 0, AmLf(1-6)/6(1 -a)
has to be less than p for the efficient rate to be positive.  This in turn implies AmAL  < p (because
A <  0(1 - 6)/6(1 - a))  and hence  1 + A  +  (1 - x)/3(1 - 6)/6(1 - a)  < 0 for the market rate
to be  positive.  Then  by  the  previous  reasoning  equation  (45)  has  a larger  (in absolute  value)
numerator  and a  smaller denominator  than  equation  (46).  Hence,  it follows  that gm  > 9m. E
The result that gm < gm is interesting because its policy  implications call for win-win policies
(policies  that boost  growth  while  the environment  can  tolerate their  effects).  This  also  proves
that  growth  and the  environment  are  not  necessarily  substitutes.  Optimal  preservation  of envi-
ronmental  quality  calls for more economic  growth than  the market provides.  Notice that F > 0
is  a  restriction  on  the parameters  of technology.  It  does not  involve  any parameter  from  the
utility function.  It should be noted that a sufficient condition for F > 0 is /(1  - 6)/6(1 - a) <  1
which in turn implies that the rate at which innovation grows is always as high as that of output.
The  above  restrictions  on  F and T  are only  sufficient  conditions  for the above  results to be
valid.  The following proposition  states the remaining  cases.
Proposition  11  Suppose  'I  <  0 and F  <  0.  The  decentralized growth rate (gn)  > Pareto
22optimal rate (  m)  if and only if rp/AmL > [(1  -I')F  +  1]/3(1  - 6)/6(1 - a). If T >  0 and
F <  0,  there are two cases:  (i)  +  '/3(1  - 6)/6(1  - a)  >  0  implies gm  9gm  as Fp/AmL
<  [(1 - I,)F + W](1 - 6)/6(1 - a) and (ii) F +  I3(1 - 6)/6(1 - a)  < 0 implies gm >  gm  as
rp/AmL |  [(1  - ')r  + TW](1  - 6)/6(1 - a).
We  now calibrate  this  model  to U.S.  data.  In  order to reduce  the  number of parameters  to
be calibrated  we  set 6 =  3 (this  is a version  of the model  discussed  in Romer,  1990).  We use
patents  as a measure of the number of new designs.  In the steady  state we know that the growth
of M  is equal to gm.  Since the growth  of patents issued in the U.S. between  1956-1990 is 0.025
per year, we have  gm = 0.025.  Our previous  estimate for  /  is 0.25  and g is  .014.  The value  of
6  implied by  equation  (43)  is 0.58.  Using  this with the fact that  Tg  + p = 0.0675,  in  equation
(45)  implies  AmL = .1882.  We  normalize  L  to one  so that Am  = .1882.  With these  estimates
the economy  is employing  13.3%  of its labor force in the R&D sector,  10.8%  in the intermediate
inputs  sector,  and  75.9%  in  the final  output  sector.  The  following  are  the  optimal  values  for
some key variables:  innovation rate is 0.067, rate of growth of output is 0.0375, employment in
R&D is 35.6%, employment in intermediate inputs is 49.8%, and employment in the final output
sector  is  only  14.6%  of the  total  labor  force.  This  suggests  that  the  U.S.  economy  ought  to
devote  more labor resources  to the R&D  sector (from  13.3%  to 35.6%)  and intermediate inputs
sectors  (from  10.8% to 49.8%).  The economy  also ought to innovate at a higher rate (about four
percentage points more than it is doing now) and enjoy a rate of economic growth  of nearly two
and  a half percent  more.  The  efficient rate  of environmental  degradation  is .0085  compared  to
the  actual rate of .0032.
III. Policy  implications
The divergence of the decentralized equilibrium growth path from the Pareto optimal one calls for
government  intervention.  This  section  focuses  on finding some  "desirable"  policy  instruments.
We  look  for  first-best  policies.  First-best  policies  are  by  definition  designed  to  remove  all
23distortions.
In  the  convex  model  of endogenous  growth,  a  pollution  tax  (or  an  income  tax)  is  needed
because  market growth is  bigger than the efficient  growth  rate.  To  see that,  suppose the  gov-
ernment  implements  a tax, 7, on  income received.  The tax-ridden growth formula  will become
[A(1  - r) - p]/I.  Let  the pre-policy  market  rate be g,.  Then  this formula  can  be written  as
gm - TA/I  . If we equate this to the efficient  rate, g, we will  get 7 =  (gm - g)I/A. Because
both  A  and  T  are  positive  and  gm  > g the tax  rate  is  indeed  positive.  With  the  parameters
estimates  reported  in  subsection  II.1,  the optimal  tax rate is 5.8%.
The  adjustment pressures that take the system  instantaneously  from the initial steady  state to
the new  one  can be described  as follows.  At  the initial  consumption,  the income tax  disturbs
the household  equilibrium.  Households  respond by  reducing their  savings.  Because  the interest
is equal  the always  constant  marginal  productivity of capital,  investment  has to fall  in order to
maintain  capital  market equilibrium.  The fall  in investment causes the rate of economic growth
and the rate at  which the environment  is degraded  to decline.
In the model of human capital  we need two policy  instruments to achieve optimal allocations
of resources:  a pollution tax and a subsidy to investment in human capital.  Because it is difficult
to derive  analytical  formulas for these two policies we will not discuss them  any further.
In the innovation-based  model  we  need  three policies for optimal  allocation  of resources:  a
subsidy to R&D  sector to internalize the externality  from  knowledge creation,  a  subsidy to the
intermediate  inputs sector to equate marginal  cost to prices,  and an emission tax on final  output
producers  to internalize pollution externalities.  With optimal  choice of levels of these taxes and
subsidies,  the optimal  allocation  of the previous  section can be decentralized into a competitive
market driven  equilibrium.
Instead  of analyzing  first-best  policies we  concentrate  only  on  second-best  policies.  There
are two reasons  for this  choice.  First,  in reality  not  all  these  instruments will  be available  for
policy  makers.  There  may be only a subset of them at their disposal  We  are, therefore,  left in
the realm of a second-best  world.  Second, the  chosen second-best  instruments will  produce the
24optimal  growth  rate.  Unlike  the previous  models  there a  large  degree  of freedom  in choosing
among policies  that influence  growth.  Here  are the few which we have  chosen.
(1) A subsidy to R&D. To encourage growth, suppose the government decided to pay a subsidy,
Xm,  per unit of labor employed  in the R&D sector every period.  The subsidy  is financed through
a lump-sum tax collected  from consumers.  The effects of this policy change will be as follows 1.
The profit maximization  condition in the R&D sector will be AmpmM/(1 - Xm)  = w.  Following
the same procedure  in calculating the growth  rate as before, we arrive  at the following subsidy-
ridden  growth  formula
(  AmL/(1  - a)(1 - Xm)  - P
g(Xm)  =  (47)
It  is  obvious  that  the  growth  rate  is  higher  the bigger  the  size  of the  subsidy.  To foster  the
competitive  equilibrium  growth  so  as to catch  up with  the optimal  growth  rate, the government
has  to  choose  the  optimal  size  for  the  subsidy.  It  isn't  hard  to  calculate  that  optimal  size.
Equating the growth  rate in equation  (47) with the optimal  one in  equation  (46) and  solving for
Xm  yields
*  1  - 1  (  - gm   (48) m   - a  AmL)
It is obvious  that 0  < Xm  <  1. The  optimal  subsidy  is an increasing  function  of L and Am  and
a decreasing  function of p.  This implies that countries with  large labor endowments,  with  more
productive labor in R&D,  and/or with more patient consumers  should subsidize  R&D more than
other  countries.  When  the model  is calibrated,  the  optimal  subsidy  rate is 50.2%.
Let us  now  try  to understand  the  mechanism  through  which  this  subsidy  achieves  the goal
for which it is designed  i.e.  enhancing  growth.  To make the  analysis simple,  let us concentrate
on what  happens in  period  zero.  The immediate  and direct  effect of the  subsidy  is to increase
the  demand  for  labor  in  the  R&D  sector.  This  will  in  turn  have  two  effects.  First,  it  raises
the growth  rate of M.  Second,  it  causes  an  excess demand  in the labor market.  For the  labor
market to clear, the  initial  wage  rate has to rise  leading to a  decrease  in  the demand  for  labor
11We analyze  only  the case where  all variables  grow  at the same rate.  This requires  P/(1  - 6)/[6(1 - a)] =  1.
25in  the  final  output  and  intermediate  inputs  sectors.  The  fall  in  Ly  and  Lx  helps  mitigate the
demand  pressure  on  labor and hence  stops  the wage  rate from  rising too much.  Eventually,  the
decrease  in both  Ly  and Lx  will  be equivalent  to the increase in Lm.  The  effects of the subsidy
on the profitability  of producing intermediate inputs, through the wage rate, are obvious.  While
the rise in w causes a  direct fall  ir in and  an indirect  decline in x,  its indirect  effects  on px  are
more  strong.  The rise in px is high enough to compensate  for the decline in profitability  caused
by the rise  of labor costs  and loss of production.  The rate  of return  on equities  issued  by this
sector,  lr/pm,  goes  up.  To maintain  the  asset market  equilibrium,  the rate  of return  on  capital
has to go up too.  This  in turn  encourages  more accumulation  of capital.  Hence the growth  of
capital  is  higher than  before.  This  together with the previous  result  that  M grows  at a  higher
rate implies that final output also grows at a rate higher than before.  Consumers  anticipating  all
these changes  in addition to the higher rate at which the quality  of the environment  deteriorates,
respond  by  increasing  the rate  at which  they  consume.  Hence  growth in consumption  is also
higher than  before the imposition of the subsidy.  If we replicate this argument  each  period we
will  establish  the  result  that  growth  has  to  be  higher  in  each  period.  It  should  be noted  that
the main  channel  through which the  subsidy boosts  growth is by  shifting labor resources  away
from  other  sectors of the economy  and directing  them into the production  of new  designs  and
knowledge  capital.
(2) A tax on labor in the final output sector  The previous  analysis  tells us that  the reason
behind  the  success  of a  subsidy to R&D  is  its ability  to divert  labor  resources  from  the final
output  and  intermediate  input  sectors  and  direct  them  to  R&D.  This  suggests  that  a  policy
to  discourage  employment  in  these  two  sectors  might  also  work.  Suppose  the  government
imposes  a  tax,  Xy,  on  any  unit  of labor  employed  in  the  final  output  sector.  As  a  result  of
this policy  change  the growth  rate  will  be given  by  g(xy)  =  (A'AmL - p)/(A + I), where
A'  =  (1 - a)/l/{(1 - a +/)[(1  - a - - )/(1 + Xy)  + f2/(1 - +  3)]}.  It is  clear that  the
growth  rate is  an increasing  function  of the tax rate.  Equating  the tax-ridden  growth  rate with
26the optimal  one we obtain  the following formula for the Pigouvian tax
(1 - a - P)(1 - a +  P)AmL
X  ()AmL-1  (49) y   (1 - ca)(AmL - )  - AmL2 L
(3) A  tax on labor in the intermediate inputs.  Like  the previous  one,  this tax  will  have  a
direct  effect on the labor employment  in the sector from which  it is collected.  To align the two
growth  paths the government  has to charge the following tax
A,m2L
XAm 2  =  -1  (50) Xd  =  (1 - a)(AmL  - g)  - (1 - a  - /3)(1 - a +  3)AmL
The  reason  behind  the  success  of this  tax  in  boosting  growth  is  its  ability  to  divert resources
from intermediate  inputs production  and direct them into R&D.
(4) An  excise  subsidy  to  the  intermediate inputs sector  Let  us  consider  the  effects  of a
subsidy,  xx,  given  to the  intermediate  inputs  sector per unit  of each x  produced.  This  subsidy
is  given  to  all  firms  in  this  sector  in  every  period.  As  a  result  of the  subsidy,  each  firm
in this  sector  reacts  by  charging  the  price  px  =  w/6A,(1  +  X,)  with  its  profits  changing  to
7r  =  (1 - a)(1  +  Xx)pxx/(1  - a  +  P).  The  no-arbitrage  condition  becomes  p + g  =  (1 -
a)(1 + X')Y/(1 - a + P3)Mpm.  Labor  employment in the subsidy-affected  sector will  change to
LX  =  32(1 + Xx)Y/(1  -a  - 3)AmMpm.  The  growth rate will  be given by the formula g(xx)  =
(AAmL-p)/(A+J), where A =  (1-a)/3/{(1-a0+3)[(1-a-0 3 )/(1+Xy)+0/2/(1-a+0)]}.
It  is clear that the growth  rate  is  an increasing  function  of the  subsidy.  It is interesting to note
that  the  above  growth  formula  is  exactly  the  same  as  the  one given  earlier  in  the  derivation
of equation  (49)  if we  replace  Xx  by  Xy.  This  has the following  implications.  To  achieve  the
optimal  growth  rate,  instead  of imposing the  tax on labor  employed  in  the final  output  sector,
we  can  apply  the identical  subsidy  to the output  of intermediate  inputs  sector  as given  by  the
formula in equation  (49).
This  subsidy  works  because  it  increases  the  profitability  of the  intermediate  inputs  sector
which  in turn forces  the price of new design to go up.  As Pm rises, the growth  rate of M  also
rises.
27(5) A subsidy to the profits of the intermediate  inputs sector  Suppose the government decided
to motivate the intermediate  inputs production  by paying  each  firm  in this  sector a  percentage,
X7,  of their profits  each  period  as a  subsidy.  Even though  they  will  continue  to  charge  their
prices  according to the old formula,  firms in this sector will earn  a total  profit of the magnitude
W = (1 + X,)(1  - 6)pxx/(1 - a +3).  As result the no-arbitrage condition becomes  (1 + X,)/(1  -
a)Y/(1 - a + 3)Mpm.  This implies that the growth rate will be g(, 1) = (AAmL  - p)/(A +  ),
where A = 0(1 + x,)/(l - a).  The optimal  subsidy  rate is, therefore,  given by
(1  - a)AmL
X  r  3(AL-)  1  (51)
Notice  that  * =  Xm/( 1  - X).  This  subsidy  has  a  direct  effect  on  the  profitability  of the
intermediate inputs  sector.
(6)  Environmental policy.  Let the  government  levies  an  effluent,  7-,  charge  per  each  unit
of pollution  emitted.  This policy  change  will  not  have  a "growth"  effect.  Instead  it will  only
affects the level of the variables.  With appropriate choice of level of r, the pollution externality
will  be internalized  and the distortion resulting from the noncompetitive pricing of intermediate
inputs  may  be removed.  This,  however,  will  not  affect the  dynamic  externality  resulting  from
knowledge  creation.  Therefore,  this policy  alone will  not  be sufficient to align  the competitive
and  optimal  paths.
IV. Summary and Concluding Remarks
We have studied the welfare implications  of environmental  externalities  in three classes  of en-
dogenous growth  models.  We  started with analyzing  the implication  of the environment  within
the simplest endogenous growth model:  the "AK" model.  Incorporating environmental  external-
ities into this model changes the rate of economic  growth provided the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution  (1/a)  is different  from  one.  With  low  elasticity  of intertemporal  substitution  and
mild  effects  of environmental  externalities  on  consumers'  welfare,  growth  rate is  higher than
when the  environment  is  ignored.  The  case  where  the  elasticity  of intertemporal  substitution
28is  small  also  implies  the growth  rate is  higher  when  consumers  value  environment  more  than
consumption  than if they  don't.
In  the  absence  of  environmental  externalities  (and  other distortions)  the  First  Theorem  of
Welfare Economics  applies:  market rate  of growth  and efficient  rate are always  the same.  The
presence of environmental  externalities  causes  the market rate to diverge from the efficient rate.
The market rate is always  bigger than the efficient rate.
These  results do  not extend  to the  human  capital  models.  The  divergence  between  the two
rates  disappears  if there  is no human  capital  externality  even when  environmental  externalities
are  present.  Given there  is  a positive  human  capital  externality  and low  elasticity  of substitu-
tion,  environmental  externalities  cause  the market to over grow compared  to what is optimal  if
consumption  is more valued than  the environment  and to under  grow if environment  is valued
more than  consumption.
In the R&D  and innovation  model,  environmental  externalities  add a third  type of distortion
and hence  render the relationship  between market  and efficient rate of economic  growth  and the
sources  of distortions  more complicated.  With  mild  environmental  externalities,  high elasticity
of intertemporal  substitution, and/or low degree of monopoly  power, the market rate is below the
efficient rate.  If, however, environmental  externalities are strong and the elasticity of substitution
is low and  monopoly  power is weak, the market rate will be high compared  to what  is optimal.
When the degree of monopoly power is strong there are many possible cases and the relationship
between  the two growth  rates could  go either way.
The comparative  static results are  similar in the three  models.  If the elasticity  of substitution
is high  and/or environmental  externalities  are  mild (or agents valuation of consumption  is more
than  the  environment),  we  obtain  standard  comparative  static  results:  growth  increases  with
productivity  and  elasticity  of intertemporal  substitution  and decreases  with the discount rate.  If
not, we  obtain the opposite results.
Due  to  the  presence  of distortion  there  is  a  lot  of room  for  intervention.  In  the  simple
endogenous growth model there is a single type of distortion, namely environmental  externalities.
29In this  case there is a  need for  only  one first-best  policy:  an income tax.  In  the human  capital
model  two policy  instruments  are  needed:  a pollution tax and subsidy  to investment  in human
capital.  To  achieve  optimal  allocation  of resources  in  the  R&D  and  innovation  model  three
instruments  are  needed:  a  pollution  tax,  a  subsidy  to  correct  the  monopoly  distortion,  and  a
subsidy  to R&D to pay  for the positive externality  of knowledge  creation.  If the interest  is in
growth,  we have  shown  that only  one policy  instrument  is needed.  We  discussed  five of these
instruments.
In both the human capital  and R&D and innovation models the relationship between the market
rate  and  the efficient  rate  is  ambiguous.  This  suggests  miscalculations  may  not  only  suggest
wrong  levels of policy instruments,  it may  even  suggest wrong type of policy  instruments.  The
need for empirical analysis is, therefore, imperative.  The calibrated  versions of these models put
the optimal  rate of economic  growth  above the market rate.
30Appendix:  Social  planner's problem for the innovation model
Since the index function D treats all x(i) the same, in an optimal  solution  labor will be allocated
in  equal  amounts to the production  of every x(i).  We will,  therefore,  have D = ALxM (1- 6)/ 6
and  Y  = AAlAK'LL-"  (-0  MO-10 6, where  Lx  denotes  labor employment  in  all  intermediate
inputs sector.  After some substitution we can write the current value Hamiltonian of this problem
as
H  =  [(CQ")l-  1  - 1]  +  71(Y - C)  +  2(L - Ly  - L,)AmM,
1-o
where  1j  and  72  are the current value costate variables  associated with the state variables  K and
M, respectively.  First-order  conditions are aH H  =  0  L=  (-")-IQ ( 1 -O  ) =  71  (A.1) DC
-~ O•L  =p  2AMIvf  1 DH  0  L  =  =  1  J1  I  C)(A.2) DL9  ½2AmAM  j  k  Y /
DI  ly 1Y  ba/C L  =  O  L  = (1 -a  -3)  AA  1 - (A.3) S,  I  72_A_  (A.4)
K  (  Y)
-^  =  --  (A.4)
"72  P2  ^  1  (  0  - -)  YY  1  C  ) 2 AmLm.  (A.5)
6  MI  q5Y)
Differentiating  equation  (A. 1) with  respect to time and rearranging  gives
(1 - ) - 1]  + p(  - a)  (A.6) C  Q  qi
Using  equation  (A.2) we can  rewrite  equations (A.4)  and (A.5)  as
"1  Y  p,  C ==  p-  ea 1  (A.7) "Y1  K  (  Y
"72  ^(1 - 6) Y  (  C\  1 2-  =  (1--  6)  1 -AmLm.  (A.8)
Y2  6  M  Y )2
As mentioned  earlier, our interest here is in an equilibrium with the following properties.  The
rate of innovation, gm, is constant while C/C =  K/K =  Y/Y  =  -1/ ?*Q/Q) =  g.  Then from
31the production  function for final  output we have
S(1 -6) =  g~(  m  (A.9)
From  equation (A.6)  we have
S=-g.  (A.10)
7i
Substituting equations  (A.2)  and (A.3)  in the labor constraint  gives
Y  (  q C  = L - Lm( 1  -r  (A.1 1 )
Using  this in equation  (A.8) yields
2-  (  -(1  )  (L  1 - 1  (A.12)
If the rate  of growth of innovation  is constant,  then equation  (A.12) implies  that  2/'72  is  also
constant.  Hence equations  (A.8),  (A.9),  and (A. 10)  suggest
-2  _  /  A  - /3(1  - 1  ] m   (A.13)
2-  Y  M  y)  6(1-a  )
Substituting this result in equation  (A. 10) and rearranging we arrive  at equation (46) in the text.
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